OpenTofu State and Plan Encryption with AWS KMS

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Author: Dominik Wombacher

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Its been a while since OpenTofu 1.7.0 (Archive: [1], [2]) introduced an exciting new feature, the State and Plan Encryption (Archive: [1], [2]) for files at rest, for local storage and remote backends. I always found it challenging to keep .tfstate files secure. Now I can use Amazon Web Servers Key Management Service (AWS KMS) with a customer managed KMS key to encrypt the state before it's uploaded to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3).

I decided to use CloudFormation to create a KMS key in eu-central-1, Europe (Frankfurt) and a replica in eu-west-1, Europe (Ireland) for backup purposes. Other AWS resources I've created: IAM User, IAM Roles, IAM Policies, S3 Bucket, DynamoDB Table and AWS Lambda function.. The Lambda function is based on CloudFormation Custom Resource AWS SSM Parameter Store SecureString and is necessary because of AWS CloudFormation and CDK doesn't support AWS SSM Parameter Store SecureString?!. Access and Secret Key for the IAM User are then auto-generated by CloudFormation and stored in AWS SSM Parameter Store.

When the AWS resource are ready, an example config to use state encryption and a S3 based remote backed looks like this:

```
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024 Dominik Wombacher <dominik@wombacher.cc>
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
terraform {
 required_version = ">= 1.8"
  encryption {
    key_provider "aws_kms" "wombelix-sideprojects" {
     kms_key_id = "arn:${var.aws_partition}:kms:${var.aws_region}:${var.aws_account_id}:key/${var.aws_kms_name}"
     region = var.aws_region
key_spec = "AES_256"
      assume role =
        role_arn = "arn:${var.aws_partition}:iam::${var.aws_account_id}:role/OpenTofuStateEncryptionRole"
     }
    method "aes gcm" "wombelix-sideprojects"
      keys = key_provider.aws_kms.wombelix-sideprojects
     method = method.aes_gcm.wombelix-sideprojects
    }
  backend "s3" {
                            = var.aws_s3_bucket
                            = "opentofu-states/${var.project}/terraform.tfstate"
                             = var.aws_region
    skip_metadata_api_check = true
                      = true
= "arn:${var.aws_partition}:kms:${var.aws_region}:${var.aws_account_id}:key/${var.aws_kms_name}"
                            = "arn:$(var.aws_partition):dynamodb:$(var.aws_region):$(var.aws_account_id):table/iac-opentofu-remote-backend"
    dvnamodb table
    assume_role = {
    role_arn = "arn:${var.aws_partition}:iam::${var.aws_account_id}:role/OpenTofuRemoteBackendRole"
```

For the above example config to interact with AWS, the following Environment variables have to be set:

```
AWS_REGION
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
TF_VAR_aws_region
TF_VAR_aws_account_id
TF_VAR_aws_kms_name
TF_VAR_aws_s3_bucket
TF_VAR_project
```

After bootstrapping with CloudFormation, all subsequent IaC can be implemented with OpenTofu. Each project gets its own unique S3 key in the form of opentofu-states/<PROJECT>/terraform.tfstate. That's all the customization it needs, which makes the solution basically maintenance free.

I like that the content of the state file is always encrypted. I also encrypt the S3 Bucket with the the customer managed key. When I use OpenTofu on my local system or in sr.ht builds, I leverage long-term Access and Secret key credentials. But the IAM User has no permissions directly assigned and can only assume a specific Role that allows access to KMS, S3 and DynamoDB. s3:DeleteObject is explicitly set to Deny and versioning enabled on the S3 Bucket. The potential attack surface is therefore very limited. In future I plan to avoid any usage of long-term credentials.

But for now the setup is already pretty decent and secure.